The question of whether morality is an objective reality or a construct of individual or cultural perspectives has long occupied philosophers. Moral subjectivism, the view that moral judgments are expressions of individual feelings or attitudes, offers a compelling alternative to objective ethical systems. This perspective suggests that "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong," are not inherent properties of actions or states of affairs but rather reflect the subjective experiences and preferences of individuals or groups. While moral subjectivism provides a framework for understanding the diversity of ethical beliefs and the personal nature of moral conviction, it faces significant challenges in explaining moral disagreement, the possibility of moral progress, and the foundation for shared societal values.
One of the primary strengths of moral subjectivism lies in its ability to account for the vast array of moral codes and beliefs observed across different cultures and historical periods. For instance, attitudes towards practices like polygamy or slavery have varied dramatically. A subjectivist might argue that these differing views simply reflect the differing sentiments and social norms of the respective societies. In the 18th century, many in Britain and America held positive views of owning slaves, seeing it as an economic necessity, while abolitionist sentiments, though nascent, were driven by a different set of feelings and ethical leanings. Moral subjectivism posits that neither view is objectively "correct"; they are merely different expressions of prevailing attitudes. Similarly, individual moral opinions can diverge sharply. One person might feel that eating meat is morally reprehensible due to empathy for animals, while another might see it as a natural and acceptable part of the food chain. Subjectivism accommodates this by stating that each person's moral judgment is valid for them, based on their feelings.
However, moral subjectivism struggles to adequately explain persistent and deeply felt moral disagreements. If morality is purely subjective, then genuine ethical disputes, such as those concerning human rights or environmental protection, become mere clashes of personal taste. Consider the global debate around climate change. While scientific data is complex, the ethical imperative to act or not act is often framed in terms of moral obligations to future generations or the natural world. A subjectivist might reduce this to a conflict between those who feel a strong obligation and those who feel less urgency. This seems to miss the intuitive sense that some moral positions are simply better justified than others, not just a matter of preference. The very act of arguing for a moral position implies a belief that one's position has some claim to correctness beyond personal feeling, a claim that subjectivism struggles to validate.
Furthermore, the concept of moral progress becomes problematic under a strict subjectivist interpretation. We generally believe that humanity has made moral progress in certain areas, such as the abolition of slavery or the advancement of women's rights. The Enlightenment thinkers, like Immanuel Kant, argued for universal moral principles derived from reason, such as the categorical imperative. While acknowledging that societies at the time did not universally adhere to these principles, the ideal of progress suggests moving towards a more objectively correct moral understanding. If morality is solely subjective, then the shift from widespread acceptance of slavery to its condemnation is simply a change in societal attitudes, not necessarily an improvement in moral understanding. It becomes difficult to explain why we praise figures like Martin Luther King Jr. for advancing civil rights if his moral stance was merely a personal feeling that happened to resonate with a growing segment of the population.
Finally, moral subjectivism offers little guidance for establishing shared ethical frameworks necessary for social cohesion and governance. Laws, social contracts, and public policy are all built on the assumption that certain moral principles are, if not universally agreed upon, at least reasonably justifiable and binding for a community. If morality is entirely subjective, then any attempt to legislate or create social norms based on ethical considerations could be dismissed as imposing one person's or group's feelings on another. This could lead to a breakdown in social order, where every moral disagreement becomes an insurmountable impasse. The concept of justice, for example, relies on the idea of fairness and impartiality that transcends individual desires. Subjectivism, by grounding morality in personal sentiment, undermines the very possibility of objective justice.
In conclusion, while moral subjectivism offers a plausible explanation for the diversity of moral views and the personal nature of ethical conviction, its implications for moral disagreement, progress, and social order are deeply problematic. The intuitive belief that some moral claims are more valid than others, and the shared human endeavor to build more just and equitable societies, suggest that morality may possess an objective or at least intersubjective dimension that subjectivism fails to capture.