The question of whether morality is objective or subjective has long been a cornerstone of philosophical debate. Two prominent theories that challenge the notion of universal moral truths are ethical subjectivism and ethical relativism. While both suggest that morality is not fixed or absolute, they diverge significantly in their foundational principles and implications for understanding moral disagreement. Ethical subjectivism posits that moral judgments are simply expressions of individual feelings or attitudes, whereas ethical relativism argues that morality is determined by cultural or societal norms. Understanding these distinctions is crucial for grasping the diverse philosophical approaches to ethics and their impact on how we evaluate actions and beliefs.
Ethical subjectivism, in its most straightforward form, asserts that moral statements are reducible to statements about the speaker's feelings or preferences. For example, when someone declares that "stealing is wrong," a subjectivist would interpret this not as a statement about an inherent quality of stealing, but rather as an expression of the speaker's disapproval or aversion to it. This view emphasizes the personal nature of morality, implying that what is right for one person might be wrong for another, entirely based on their internal states. A key implication of subjectivism is that moral disputes are not genuine disagreements about an external reality, but rather clashes of personal sentiment. Consequently, there can be no objective basis for resolving such disputes, as there is no truth to appeal to beyond individual experience.
Ethical relativism, while sharing subjectivism's rejection of universal moral standards, locates the source of morality not in individual feelings, but in the shared norms and values of a society or culture. Cultural relativism, a common form of this theory, suggests that moral codes are products of their cultural contexts. What is considered morally right in one society might be considered morally wrong in another, and neither is inherently superior. For instance, practices like arranged marriages, which are accepted in some cultures, might be viewed as morally objectionable in others. This perspective implies that moral judgments are only valid within the framework of a particular culture. When evaluating an action, one must consider the prevailing norms of the community to which the actor belongs.
The divergence between these two theories becomes particularly clear when considering moral disagreement. For the ethical subjectivist, a disagreement between two individuals about the morality of an action stems from their differing internal states. If Alice believes eating meat is wrong and Bob believes it is permissible, Alice is simply expressing her dislike for meat consumption, while Bob is expressing his acceptance. There is no objective fact of the matter about whether eating meat is wrong, only whether Alice feels it is wrong and Bob feels it is permissible. In contrast, for the cultural relativist, a moral disagreement often arises from differing cultural norms. If Alice belongs to a culture that values vegetarianism for religious reasons and Bob belongs to a culture where meat consumption is a staple, their disagreement reflects their distinct cultural moral frameworks.
However, both ethical subjectivism and ethical relativism face significant philosophical challenges. Ethical subjectivism, by reducing morality to personal feeling, struggles to account for the persuasive force of moral arguments or the possibility of moral progress. If morality is purely subjective, then one person's moral conviction has no more weight than another's, and the idea of changing one's mind based on reason or evidence becomes problematic. Furthermore, it seems to imply that no one can ever be wrong about morality, which contradicts our common intuitions. Ethical relativism, while offering a more robust account of cultural diversity, faces the problem of defining what constitutes a "culture" or "society" for moral purposes. It also raises questions about how to critique the moral practices of other cultures, especially those that seem to violate fundamental human rights, such as slavery or genocide. If morality is solely determined by cultural norms, then such practices are morally permissible within the cultures that endorse them, making universal condemnation impossible.
In conclusion, ethical subjectivism and ethical relativism offer compelling alternatives to absolutist ethical theories by grounding morality in human experience rather than abstract principles. Subjectivism locates morality within individual feelings, while relativism grounds it in collective cultural norms. Despite their shared rejection of universal moral objectivity, their different foundations lead to distinct implications for understanding moral judgment, disagreement, and the possibility of moral critique. Both theories, however, present significant challenges that continue to fuel ethical inquiry, forcing us to confront the complex relationship between individual conviction, societal values, and the very nature of right and wrong.