Conventionalist ethical relativism proposes that moral truths are not absolute but are instead created and sustained by the agreements or customs within a particular society or culture. This perspective suggests that what is considered right or wrong is fundamentally a matter of social convention, meaning that morality itself is a human construct, variable across different communities and historical periods. While this view offers a compelling explanation for moral diversity and challenges ethnocentric judgments, it faces significant philosophical hurdles, particularly concerning its implications for moral progress, the possibility of cross-cultural moral criticism, and the very definition of a "society" whose conventions are determinative.
One of the primary arguments supporting conventionalist ethical relativism stems from the observable fact of widespread moral disagreement across cultures. For instance, practices such as polygamy, which is accepted in some societies, are condemned in others. Similarly, attitudes towards euthanasia vary dramatically; in the Netherlands, it is legally regulated, while in many other nations, it remains a criminal offense. Proponents argue that these differences aren't mere variations in applying a universal moral standard but reflect genuinely different moral codes, each valid within its own conventional framework. According to this view, morality is akin to language or etiquette; there is no objectively "correct" way to speak or behave, only socially accepted norms. The conventionalist holds that moral judgments are essentially statements about what is permitted or forbidden by the rules of a particular community. This removes the need to posit transcendent moral facts and grounds morality in observable social phenomena.
However, this reliance on social agreement presents considerable difficulties. If morality is simply a matter of convention, then the idea of moral reform or progress becomes problematic. Consider the abolition of slavery in the United States. From a conventionalist standpoint, slavery was morally permissible as long as it was a widely accepted social practice. The abolitionists, who challenged this convention, would, by definition, be acting immorally according to the prevailing norms. This outcome seems counterintuitive to most people, who view the abolition of slavery as a clear moral improvement. Similarly, if a society collectively agrees to a harmful practice, such as systemic discrimination against a minority group, conventionalist relativism offers no grounds for criticizing this convention from within or outside the society. The civil rights movement in the US, for example, can be seen as a struggle to change an unjust convention that was, for a long time, widely accepted.
Furthermore, conventionalist ethical relativism struggles to define what constitutes a "society" or "culture" for the purpose of determining moral truth. Are we referring to a nation-state, a local community, a religious group, or even a family? If an individual belongs to multiple groups with conflicting moral norms, which convention dictates their moral obligations? For example, a person might be part of a national culture that condones certain business practices that their religious community deems unethical. The conventionalist framework offers no clear mechanism for resolving such conflicts, potentially leading to moral paralysis or an arbitrary choice of allegiance. This ambiguity weakens the claim that morality is straightforwardly determined by group consensus.
Finally, the conventionalist perspective can undermine the very possibility of meaningful cross-cultural moral judgment. If morality is entirely relative to social conventions, then judging the practices of another culture – say, female genital mutilation in some African societies or the caste system in historical India – becomes impossible without adopting an ethnocentric bias. While advocates of relativism often aim to promote tolerance and understanding, their position can inadvertently lead to a form of moral quietism, where one is forbidden from condemning even the most heinous acts of another culture on the grounds that they are simply "different." This seems to negate the intuition that some actions are wrong, regardless of cultural approval.
In conclusion, conventionalist ethical relativism offers an attractive explanation for moral diversity by grounding morality in social agreement. However, its implications for moral progress, its difficulty in defining the relevant social group, and its potential to paralyze cross-cultural moral criticism reveal significant weaknesses. While acknowledging the importance of cultural context in understanding moral practices, a robust ethical framework must also account for universal moral principles and the possibility of objective moral evaluation, which conventionalism, in its strict form, struggles to accommodate.