The United States Constitution, often lauded as a beacon of liberty and democratic ideals, has been subject to persistent scholarly debate regarding its foundational relationship with slavery. Eric Waldstreicher's article, "How the Constitution Was Indeed Pro Slavery," directly confronts this historical interpretation, arguing that the document, far from being a neutral observer or even a subtly anti-slavery instrument, actively incorporated and protected the institution of chattel slavery. Waldstreicher contends that specific clauses and the very compromises made during the Constitutional Convention reveal a deliberate design to safeguard slaveholding interests, thereby embedding slavery deep within the fabric of the nascent republic. This essay will explore Waldstreicher's central arguments, examining how he uses constitutional text and historical context to demonstrate that the Founders, whether through explicit provisions or strategic omissions, engineered a framework that facilitated, rather than hindered, the perpetuation of slavery.
Waldstreicher's primary thesis rests on the interpretation of several key constitutional provisions. He focuses on Article I, Section 2, the "Three-Fifths Compromise," which counted enslaved individuals as three-fifths of a person for purposes of congressional representation and direct taxation. While often framed as a compromise, Waldstreicher argues it was a significant victory for slaveholding states. It inflated their political power in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College beyond their actual free population, granting them disproportionate influence in national policy for decades. This clause, he asserts, was not a step towards eventual abolition but a pragmatic recognition and enhancement of slaveholders' political leverage. Furthermore, Article I, Section 9, which prohibited Congress from banning the "importation" of slaves until 1808, is presented not as a temporary concession but as a guarantee of the slave trade's continuation for twenty years. This period allowed for the significant expansion of slavery into new territories, particularly after the invention of the cotton gin in 1793, directly contradicting any notion of the Constitution acting as an eventual brake on the institution.
Beyond explicit clauses, Waldstreicher also highlights the Constitution's silence on the issue of fugitive slaves as another indicator of its pro-slavery bias. Article IV, Section 2, the Fugitive Slave Clause, mandated the return of escaped slaves to their owners. While seemingly straightforward, Waldstreicher implies that this clause, in conjunction with the general framework of property rights enshrined in the Constitution, implicitly supported the notion of slaves as property. The absence of any provision for due process or freedom suits for enslaved people underscores the Founders' prioritization of property rights for slaveholders over the inherent humanity of the enslaved. The very act of creating a federal union that recognized and protected slave property, even indirectly, meant that the federal government was complicit in its maintenance, a far cry from a document aiming for universal liberty.
The historical context of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 further bolsters Waldstreicher's argument. He points to the fact that delegates from Southern states, and even some from Northern states with economic ties to slavery, exerted considerable influence. The fear of secession and the desire for a strong, unified nation trumped any strong abolitionist sentiment that might have been present among a minority of delegates. The compromises were not born of moral ambiguity but of a calculated decision to prioritize national unity and economic stability, with the economic stability of the slaveholding South being a crucial component. The Constitution, therefore, can be seen as a pragmatic document that accommodated and, by necessity, protected the institution it did not explicitly endorse, ensuring its survival and expansion for generations. Waldstreicher concludes that understanding the Constitution as inherently pro-slavery is essential for a correct historical interpretation of the period and for understanding the enduring legacy of slavery in American society.