The Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-2011 fundamentally reshaped the political landscapes of the Middle East and North Africa, exposing deep-seated tensions between state institutions and civilian populations. While the immediate aftermath saw widespread upheaval, the long-term impact on civil-military relations varied dramatically between nations. Examining Turkey and Egypt before and after this period reveals contrasting paths: Turkey, despite its own internal challenges, saw a gradual strengthening of civilian control over the military, whereas Egypt experienced a reassertion of military dominance following a brief, chaotic period of civilian experimentation. These divergent outcomes stem from distinct historical legacies, institutional strengths, and the specific dynamics of their respective post-uprising transitions.
Before the Arab Spring, both Turkey and Egypt possessed militaries deeply embedded in their respective political systems, though their roles differed in emphasis. In Turkey, the military had historically acted as a self-proclaimed guardian of the secular republic established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923. This guardianship often manifested as interventionist, albeit typically through coups or the threat thereof, to prevent perceived threats to secularism or national integrity. The Turkish military was a powerful, independent institution, enjoying significant autonomy and influence over foreign policy and domestic security. In contrast, Egypt's military, while influential since the 1952 Free Officers' Movement, operated more directly as an economic and political actor within a more authoritarian framework. Its power was less about ideological guardianship and more about maintaining the existing regime's stability and its own privileged economic position, largely through patronage networks and state-controlled enterprises.
The Arab Spring initially promised a seismic shift in both countries. In Egypt, the Tahrir Square protests in early 2011 led to the ousting of Hosni Mubarak, a long-serving autocrat who had maintained a delicate balance with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). The subsequent period was marked by intense political flux, including the brief tenure of elected President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. During this transitional phase, civilian oversight of the military was nascent and fragile. The SCAF, though publicly stepping back, retained considerable leverage, and the subsequent military coup in 2013, which deposed Morsi, effectively re-established military dominance. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the former defense minister, transitioned from military leader to president, solidifying the army's pervasive role in politics, economy, and society, often under the guise of restoring order and national security.
Turkey's trajectory diverged significantly. While the initial years of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan saw a reduction in the military's overt political influence, the true test came during the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and the attempted coup of July 2016. The Gezi protests, though met with a harsh state response, did not lead to military intervention; instead, the civilian government asserted its authority. The 2016 coup attempt, however, proved a watershed moment. The widespread civilian mobilization against the coup plotters, coupled with decisive action by the elected government and the loyalty of significant portions of the armed forces to the civilian leadership, led to a decisive defeat for the mutineers. This event, while deeply traumatic, ultimately resulted in a significant strengthening of civilian control. Post-coup purges, while controversial, dramatically reduced the military's internal power structure and its capacity for independent political action, consolidating civilian oversight under the presidency.
The contrast in outcomes can be attributed to several factors. Egypt's pre-Arab Spring military was a deeply entrenched economic and political monolith, with a vested interest in maintaining its privileged status, making a return to military rule almost inevitable once civilian leadership faltered. The deep divisions within Egyptian society and the lack of robust, unified civilian institutions capable of effectively challenging military power facilitated this reassertion. Turkey, conversely, had a more historically defined secularist military establishment, but also a more developed, albeit imperfect, multi-party democratic tradition. The AKP government had, over years, worked to curb the military's formal powers, and the dramatic nature of the 2016 coup attempt galvanized a broad spectrum of Turkish society and political actors in defense of civilian rule. This unified civilian response, alongside the government's decisive leadership, allowed for a more profound shift towards civilian supremacy than occurred in Egypt, where the military effectively absorbed the post-uprising political space.
In conclusion, the Arab Spring served as a catalyst that, in Turkey, ultimately led to a more robust assertion of civilian authority over the military, albeit through a crisis. In Egypt, however, the same period witnessed a regression, with the military re-establishing and even strengthening its hegemonic position after a brief interlude of civilian experimentation. These contrasting outcomes highlight the enduring importance of historical institutional structures, the resilience of civilian society, and the specific nature of political transitions in shaping the delicate balance between military and civilian power in the post-Arab Spring Middle East.