John Locke’s philosophical contributions profoundly shaped Western thought, particularly his theories on property, consent, and natural rights. While often celebrated for his influence on political philosophy and epistemology, his less-discussed views on marriage offer a unique lens through which to understand his broader framework, particularly his conception of the conjugal society as a voluntary contract rooted in practical necessity and mutual benefit. For Locke, marriage was not merely a social or religious institution but a rational agreement, akin to other social contracts, that individuals entered into for specific, tangible reasons, primarily the procreation and education of children. This perspective, articulated in his Two Treatises of Government, grounds marriage in natural law and the concept of property, albeit a property defined by the rights and responsibilities inherent in the union rather than mere ownership of persons.
Locke’s initial discussion of marriage emerges from his exploration of the state of nature and the origins of political society. He posits that in the state of nature, individuals possess inherent rights, including the right to life, liberty, and property. While he rejects Robert Filmer’s patriarchal absolutism, Locke acknowledges that the initial family unit, formed by a man and a woman, predates formal government. This union, he argues, is not solely driven by instinct but by a voluntary compact. The primary purpose of this compact, for Locke, is the continuation of the species. He writes, "God Almighty… hath thus far ordained Man, and Woman, to keep each other’s company, and to propagate their kind." However, this biological imperative is quickly contextualized within a framework of rational agreement. The “society which is properly Conjugal is made up of these two persons, Man and Woman, and is by the Institution of God, but it is by the Contract of Man and Woman… that they become One Society, and are upon that Contract, one Man and Woman.” This emphasizes that while the inclination to procreate is natural, the formation of a lasting marital bond is a matter of deliberate consent.
Crucially, Locke connects marriage to the concept of property, not in the sense of a woman being owned by her husband, but in terms of shared rights and responsibilities. The conjugal society, he explains, is formed for "their mutual help and the good of their Posterity." The woman, by entering the contract, implicitly agrees to a certain subordination, not out of inherent inferiority, but due to the practicalities of childbearing and rearing. Locke notes that the "stronger, that is, the wiser, or stronger sex, will commonly prevail," suggesting a pragmatic division of labor and leadership within the household. This does not, however, grant the husband absolute dominion. The power within the conjugal society is not absolute but limited by the contract's purpose: the well-being of the family. The husband's authority, Locke clarifies, is "much less than that of the Father," and it is entirely contingent on the wife's consent and the shared goal of raising children. If the contract fails in its aims, or if the terms are violated, the union can dissolve.
The dissolution of marriage is another area where Locke’s contractarian view is evident. Unlike indissoluble unions imposed by religious doctrine, Locke allows for divorce under specific circumstances. He distinguishes between the dissolution of the conjugal society and the dissolution of the marriage itself. The conjugal society can dissolve if its purpose is defeated, for instance, if children are raised or if one party fails to uphold their end of the agreement. However, the bond of marriage, as a personal commitment, might persist in some form, particularly in relation to offspring. Locke states, "If the Contract be, that they shall live together, till their Children be grown up, and able to provide for themselves, and then separate; the Conjugal Society is dissolved by the end of the Contract." This pragmatic approach, allowing for separation when the practical aims of the union are no longer being met, stands in stark contrast to the absolutist views of his contemporaries. It prioritizes the functionality and welfare of the family unit over rigid adherence to an unbroken marital bond.
In conclusion, John Locke’s perspective on marriage presents it as a rational, voluntary contract between two individuals, primarily for the purpose of procreation and mutual support. Grounded in natural law and the principles of consent, it establishes a "conjugal society" where power is delineated by the contract's objectives and the shared responsibility for offspring. While acknowledging a degree of wifely subordination due to practical considerations, Locke firmly rejects absolute dominion, allowing for the dissolution of the union when its foundational purposes are undermined. His views, therefore, position marriage not as a divinely ordained, unbreakable sacrament, but as a pragmatic agreement that reflects his broader philosophy of individual rights, consent, and the social contract.